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1Abstract
T h ec r e a t i o no fa na r t i ﬁcial market through a tradable permit system as a remedy against market
failure is gaining popularity among analysts and policymakers. We show that in an intertemporal
competitive economy, a tradable permit system may not achieve eﬃciency without setting appropriate
permit interest rates (rewards for holding permits), and to ﬁnd them, we must know in advance the
path of eﬃcient permit prices, which is diﬃcult or impossible to obtain. We deal with this problem in
two ways. First, we seek a special case in which the permit interest rates are given by a simple rule.
Second, we propose a mechanism by which the permit interest rates are generated endogenously.
The determinacy of an equilibrium under a tradable permit system is also examined.
Keywords:a r t i ﬁcial market, tradable permit system, general equilibrium, permit interest rate,
permit bank, indeterminacy
JEL Classiﬁcation: H23; K32; Q58.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
To control pollution eﬃciently, Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) independently developed the idea
of transferable discharge permits. The ﬁrst application was the Emission Trading Program by the
US Environmental Protection Agency, which started from 1974 and dealt with a number of air
pollutants. Since then, a tradable permit system as a means of remedying market failure has been
gaining popularity among analysts and policymakers. Successful experiences are accumulated in the
practice of environmental policies (Tietenberg, 2006). The US 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
initiating the sulfur dioxide (SO2)/acid rain trading program is a notable case (Carlson et al., 2000).
As another example, the European Union initiated its Emissions Trading Scheme in January 2005,
which is the largest emissions trading market in the world (Kruger and Pizer, 2004). The invention
of a tradable permit system is one of the most important contributions of environmental economics
to the environmental policy.
Montgomery (1972) formally proved that the creation of an artiﬁcial market through a tradable
permit system can restore eﬃciency at equilibrium in a competitive economy. While his analysis
was conducted in a static environment, some researchers have recently extended their analyses to
an intertemporal competitive economy. Except for the earliest two works of Cronshow and Kruse
(1996) and Rubin (1996), studies by Kling and Rubin (1997), Leiby and Rubin (2001), and Yates
and Cronshaw (2001) found that if the permits are bankable (i.e., saved for future use), a tradable
permit system would not achieve eﬃciency without setting appropriate permit interest rates (i.e.,
rewards of holding permits).
The key point is as follows: Consider a tradable permit system to control pollution emissions.
Let a ﬁrm hold permits of amount B>0.D e n o t eb yr(t) the equilibrium interest rate at time t ≥ 0.
For any t,t0 ≥ 0 in the valid term of the permits, the equilibrium price of the permits pe(t) satisﬁes
the arbitrage condition:








This equation with initial value p(0) determines the entire path of equilibrium prices. On the other
hand, the eﬃcient prices of permits p∗(t) are determined by the marginal damage cost of pollution
emissions at the social optimum. Because this eﬃcient pricing rule is independent of the arbitrage
condition, there is no reason for the equilibrium prices and the eﬃcient prices to have the same
3values.
To achieve eﬃciency in the tradable permit system, we need to introduce a permit interest rate





condition above is satisﬁed with pe(t)=p∗(t) as:






















Notice that the equation is a very familiar intertemporal arbitrage condition: the sum of the return
and capital gain of an asset coincides with the interest rate at each point in time, ˙ B/B + ˙ p/p = r.
A regulatory authority needs to exogenously set the appropriate permit interest rates, deﬁned
in (1), for a tradable permit system to achieve eﬃcient pollution control. However, a problem
of information collection arises: the exact calculation of permit interest rates requires information
on the eﬃcient permit prices p∗(t). This could be a heavy burden, greatly reducing the merit of
a tradable permit system, because it is expected, in a static framework, that the eﬃcient prices
are spontaneously and posteriorly found through an artiﬁcial market created by a tradable permit
system.
While less focus on this problem has been provided in the literature,1 it is a crucial problem
because the virtue of a market-based solution or market per se is its potential to achieve eﬃciency
without collecting information scattered over an economy. Notice, also, that a Pigovian tax, an
alternative market-based policy measure, needs the same information on the eﬃcient prices and thus
shares the same information problem.
This paper analyzes this problem. We identify a set of conditions under which the permit interest
rate is obtained by a simple rule. We also show that there is a mechanism by which the permit interest
1The reason is in part that the problem relates to the arbitrage condition that does not appear in a static analysis
which is still a major framework in environmental economics. The seminal paper on the use of an artiﬁcial market
by Montgomery (1972) is written in a static framework. The book by Baumol and Oates (1988), a classic work on
economic analysis of environmental policies, spares only one chapter for a dynamic analysis and the chapter discusses
natural resource management. The literature survey on environmental economics by Cropper and Oates (1992) is
restricted to static analyses.
4rate is generated through a market spontaneously, although the mechanism has a ﬂaw that may lead
to the indeterminacy of equilibria.
Because a tradable permit system is a policy measure that minimizes the cost of achieving an
exogenously given policy target, most studies use a partial equilibrium approach and examine the
cost eﬀectiveness. On the contrary, this paper takes a general equilibrium approach and examines
the eﬃciency. The main reason is that we seek rules of thumb on the appropriate permit interest
rate and the richer structure of a general equilibrium model, compared with partial equilibrium and
cost minimization models, is expected to give us clues. Furthermore, unlike most studies that use a
ﬁnite time horizon model reﬂecting that tradable permit systems in practice have a ﬁnite planning
period, we use an inﬁnite time horizon, except for a special model for global warming. This choice
can be theoretically supported because a policy measure is required whenever market failure exists.
Correspondingly, we assume that a permit can be banked and withdrawn at any time.
However, one may suspect that this assumption exaggerates the problem of intertemporal arbi-
trage. That is, if the term of a permit is reasonably short, then without the permit interest rate, a
tradable permit system may achieve an almost cost-eﬀective or eﬃcient outcome. Indeed, it is true
for the limit case where the term of a permit is inﬁnitesimal. Stokey (1998) proved that a tradable
permit system with one period permits can achieve eﬃciency in a general equilibrium framework.
With a perishable permit, the permit interest rate is irrelevant. In practice, however, permits are
usually bankable.2
Global warming is a good example to show that even if the term of a permit is suﬃciently
short, the permit interest rate is not negligible. It is said that the consequences of greenhouse gas
emissions by the present generation have appeared after more than a half century. Because the
practical planning period of a tradable permit program (that would be some years) is suﬃciently
short relative to the problem, we tend to think that it is simply total emissions over the planning
period that matters. Then, cost-eﬀective pollution abatement is achieved by emission permits without
setting the permit interest rate. However, note that what aﬀects future generations is not the total
emissions, but the concentration of the greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Then, the emission path
under a zero permit interest rate could be suboptimal. We will formally show that the appropriate
2An exception is the Lead Trading Program in the United States (1982—1987), where no banking was allowed
initially. However, it was allowed in late 1984.
5rate is not zero for our global warming model. As such, even for global warming, the permit interest
rate should be considered when a tradable permit system is designed.
This paper is organized as follows: We begin by deriving an optimal permit interest rate, using
both models of ﬂows and stocks of pollution. For each case, by specifying preferences and technology
as well as the environment, we attempt to ﬁnd some rules of thumb for an appropriate permit interest
rate. We show that if the utility function, the production function, and/or the assimilation function
of pollution have speciﬁc properties such as linearity, additive separability, and isoelasticity, then the
appropriate permit interest rates are obtained from a simple rule. As a speciﬁc but important case,
we also examine a model for global warming.
In Section 3, we modify a tradable permit system to overcome the problem of the permit interest
rate. We create a bank of permits, which we refer to as a permit bank. Each permit holder has an
account of permits in the bank. Deposits and withdrawals are made in terms of permits, whereas the
balance is expressed in monetary terms by multiplying the quantity of permits held by their market
price. The prevailing market interest rate is applied. The idea of a permit bank comes from the
similarity and diﬀerences between tradable permits and money. A permit is a means of exchange
and can be saved, which is similar to money. The diﬀerences compared with money are that a
permit is exchangeable only for a speciﬁc nonmarket good such as a pollution emission right and a
permit does not bear interest. By creating a bank of permits, a permit becomes more like money
and a tradable permit system with a permit bank comes to be embedded into a market mechanism
in a more seamless way. We show that a tradable permit system with a permit bank can achieve
eﬃciency at equilibrium, where the permit interest rates could be determined by a market without
governmental intervention.
Section 4 deals with the dynamics of equilibrium paths under a tradable permit system. While
a tradable permit system with a permit bank has desirable features, the permit market allows the
equilibrium paths to have more degrees of freedom than the case with the government exogenously
setting the path of permit interest rates. Then, the concern with equilibrium indeterminacy arises.
We show that an indeterminacy emerges under a tradable permit system with a permit bank. For a
tradable permit system with exogenous permit interest rates, we show that a steady state equilibrium
is saddle point stable and is thus locally determinate.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks that summarize and discuss the results. Although it is
6also important to determine the appropriate amount of issue of permits, this study focuses on the
permit interest rate.
2 Permit interest rate
2.1 Flow pollution model
Consider a simple competitive economy. The production technology of the economy is described
by a “pollution as an input” production function F(K,X),w h e r eK ≥ 0 is the capital stock and
X denotes the pollution ﬂow. We assume that the production function F : R2
+ → R+ is concave
and smooth with F(0,X)=F(K,0) = 0, FK(K,X) > 0, FX(K,X) > 0,a n dlimK→0 FK(K,X)=
limX→0 FX(K,X)=∞ for all K>0 and X>0.3 There is an upper limit on pollution emissions
X because pollution is in fact a byproduct of the production, and not an input. Assume that the
upper limit proportionally depends on the amount of the capital stock K. Therefore, the eﬀective
domain of F is given by {(K,X) ∈ R2
+ :0≤ X ≤ φK} with a positive constant, φ.G i v e n K,
the potential product is F(K,φK) and the corresponding pollution emission is φK. If the actual
pollution emission is X<φK, then some resources are used for abatement activities and the actual
output is less than the potential: F(K,X) <F (K,φK). With this formulation, we can treat the
pollution ﬂow as an input. See Copeland and Taylor (2003, chapter 2) for an elaborate explanation
of a pollution as an input in the production function. Throughout the paper, the initial endowment
of capital stock is denoted by K0. We assume no capital depreciation for simplicity.
There is a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived households of measure one. Let ρ > 0 be the time
discount rate and let u(c,X) be the instantaneous utility function, where c denotes the consumption
rate. Assume that u : R2
+ → R ∪ {−∞} is a concave and smooth function with uc (c,X) > 0,
uX (c,X) < 0, limc→0 uc (c,X)=∞,a n dlimX→0 uX (c,X)=0for all c>0 and X>0. Here, we
assume that pollution ﬂow X aﬀects utility. In the next subsection, we consider the case in which
the stock of pollution aﬀects utility.
3The notation fx for a function f denotes the partial derivative with respect to its argument x: fx := ∂f/∂x.






subject to ˙ K(t)=F(K(t),X(t)) − c, 0 ≤ X(t) ≤ φK(t),K (0) = K0 > 0. (3)
The associated Hamiltonian is given by:
H(c,X,K,λ,μ)=u(c,X)+λ[F(K,X) − c]+μ(φK − X).
If (c∗(t),X∗(t),K∗(t)) is an optimal path, then there exist the costate variable λ∗(t) and the Lagrange
multiplier μ∗(t), with which (3) and the following hold for each t ≥ 0:
uc(c∗(t),X∗(t)) − λ∗(t)=0 (4)
uX(c∗(t),X∗(t)) + λ∗(t)FX(K∗(t),X∗(t)) − μ∗(t)=0 , (5)
˙ λ∗(t)/λ∗(t)=ρ − FK(K∗(t),X∗(t)) + φμ∗(t)/λ∗(t), (6)
μ∗(t) ≥ 0, and μ∗(t)[φK∗(t) − X∗(t)] = 0, (7)




We are interested in how the optimal path (c∗(t),X∗(t),K∗(t)) can be mimicked in a competitive
economy when the regulatory authority implements a tradable permit system. Throughout this
paper, it is assumed that the permit is emission-based, so that one unit of emissions are allowed in
return for one permit. Let B>0 be the total amount of permits that are distributed to ﬁrms once
in the initial period. Denote the permit interest rate by a(t), a measurable function on [0,∞). Then,
a tradable permit system is deﬁn e db yap a i r(B,a(t)). Let the products be the numeraire and p(t)
be the price of the tradable permits. Denote by r(t) the interest rate at time t. The representative













subject to π(t)=F(K(t),X(t)) − r(t)K(t) − p(t)y(t)
˙ B(t)=a(t)B(t) − X(t)+y(t),B (0) = B,










where y(t) is the amount of permits purchased (if y(t) > 0)o rs o l d( i fy(t) < 0)a tt i m et,a n dt h e
last constraint is a no-Ponzi game condition, without which the ﬁrm can buy permits unlimitedly
and emit its pollution arbitrarily.





u(c(t), ˜ X(t))e−ρtdt (10)











where ˜ X(t) is the pollution ﬂow, m(t) is the balance of the assets, and ˜ π(t) is the proﬁt distribution
from ﬁrms. ˜ X(t) and ˜ π(t) are exogenous for a household. The last inequality in the constraint is a
no-Ponzi game condition.
If with a pair of prices (re(t),p e(t)), the solutions to the problems (9) and (10) satisfy the market
clearing condition and the household fulﬁls its expectation, they constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 1: Competitive equilibrium. The tuple
(πe(t),Xe(t),ye(t),Ke(t),Be(t),c e(t),m e(t), ˜ πe(t), ˜ Xe(t);re(t),p e(t);K0,B,a(t))
is a competitive equilibrium if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. (πe(t),Xe(t),ye(t),Ke(t),Be(t)) is a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem (9) given (re(t),p e(t);B,a(t)).
2. (ce(t),m e(t)) is a solution to the household’s problem (10) given (K0, ˜ πe(t), ˜ Xe(t),re(t)).
93. ye(t)=0 , me(t)=Ke(t), ce(t)=F(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − ˙ Ke(t), Xe(t)= ˜ Xe(t), πe(t)=˜ πe(t).
The (current value) Hamiltonian for the ﬁrm’s problem (9) is written as:
HF(K,X,y,B,ζ,ν,t)=F(K,X) − r(t)K − p(t)y + ζ [a(t)B − X + y]+ν (φK − X).
Therefore, at equilibrium, the following hold:
(a) FK(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − re(t)+ν(t)φ =0 ; (b) FX(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − pe(t) − ν(t)=0 ; (11)
(c) ˙ pe(t)=[ re(t) − a(t)]pe(t); (d) ν(t)(φKe(t) − Xe(t)) = 0,ν(t) ≥ 0.
For the household’s problem (10), the associated Hamiltonian is written as:
HH(m,c,λ,t)=u(c, ˜ X(t)) + λ(re(t)m − ˜ π(t) − c).
At equilibrium, the following hold:
(a) uc(ce(t), ˜ Xe(t)) − λ(t)=0 ;( b )˙ λ(t)/λ(t)=ρ − re(t). (12)
The conditions 1 and 2 in Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed if (11) and (12) hold and the no-Ponzi game
conditions for the ﬁrm and the household are satisﬁed with equality.
Now, we state the necessary conditions under which a tradable permit system (B,a(t)) can
achieve the social optimum in a competitive economy.
Proposition 1 A tradable permit system (B,a(t)) can achieve eﬃciency at a competitive equilibrium






















10Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium path is optimal, that is, (ce(t),Xe(t),Ke(t)) = (c∗(t),X∗(t),K∗(t)).
For the household, ˜ Xe(t)=X∗(t) at equilibrium and (12 a) is satisﬁed when λ(t)=λ∗(t) from (4).
(12 b) is satisﬁed with the interest rate re(t)=ρ−˙ λ∗(t)/λ∗(t). Because me(t)=K∗(t) at equilibrium,












λ∗(t))K∗(t)e−ρt =0 . (16)




φ = FK(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − ν(t)φ.
(11 b) is satisﬁed when:
pe(t)=−uX(c∗(t),X∗(t))/λ∗(t), (17)



















With (14), the no-Ponzi game condition for the ﬁrm is satisﬁed with equality, because ˙ Be(t)=



















Finally, (15) is immediate from (11).
The following three comments are provided in relation to the proposition:
1. As indicated in the introduction, a tradable permit system is a useful policy tool only if the permit
interest rate is set appropriately, as in (13) of Proposition 1.
2. Even if no abatement is optimal (X∗(t)=φK∗(t)), the price of permits is positive, as shown in
(17). This indicates that even when pollution control is not required, pollution pricing is necessary–
otherwise, some markets would be distorted. The principle is that pollution should be priced at the
aggregate marginal damage at an eﬃcient equilibrium, which is demonstrated for the Pigovian tax
in a general equilibrium model by Baumol and Oates (1988, chapter 4). Hence, a permit system
11should be implemented over all periods, despite the optimal level of pollution control. Stokey (1998)
discovered this fact and showed the following: without pricing of pollution, the capital market is
distorted so that it prevents an eﬃcient outcome. Notice that this point does not appear in a static
analysis or in a partial equilibrium analysis such as Leiby and Rubin (2001).
3. In general, it would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd an appropriate path of permit interest rates a(t). However,
Proposition 1 provides us with some cases where there is a simple rule for appropriate a(t):( a )t h e
marginal disutility of the pollution −uX(c,X) is constant. In this case, a(t)=ρ; (b) the elasticity
of the marginal disutility of the pollution −XuXX(c,X)/uX(c,X)=γ > 0 is constant. In this case,
a(t)=ρ − γ ˙ X∗(t)/X∗(t); (c) the pollution abatement is necessary for all periods (X∗(t) < φK∗(t)
for all t ≥ 0), and the marginal abatement cost of the pollution FX(K,X) is constant.4 In this case,
a(t)=r(t) and the permit price p(t) will be constant;5 (d) the pollution abatement is necessary for
all periods and the elasticity of the marginal abatement cost −XFXX(K,X)/FX(K,X)=β > 0 is
constant. In this case, a(t)=r − β ˙ X∗(t)/X∗(t). Note that for the cases of (b) and (d), the permit
interest rate is greater than the time discount rate and the market interest rate, respectively, if the
optimal pollution is decreasing in time ( ˙ X∗(t) < 0).
2.2 Stock pollution model
In this subsection, we consider a case where the pollution stock aﬀects the utility. Let S(t) denote
the pollution stock at time t. We assume that the evolution of the pollution stock is governed by
˙ S(t)=A(S(t),X(t)),
where X(t) is the pollution ﬂow as before. The assimilation function A : R2
+ → R is assumed to
be concave with AX(S,X) > 0 for all (S,X) > 0. The instantaneous utility function is modiﬁed as
u(c,S). The utility function is concave and smooth with uc (c,S) > 0, uS (c,S) < 0, limc→0 uc (c,S)=
∞,a n dlimS→0 uE (c,S)=0for all c>0 and S>0. The discount rate ρ and the production
technology F(K,X) are the same as before.
4Note that the marginal productivity FX can be interpreted as the marginal abatement cost measured by units of
the product.
5If the conditions in (a) and (c) are met, then the optimal path is composed of a bang-bang control and a singular
control, because the associated Hamiltonian is linear in X. The interiority in (c) implies that the economy is at an
interior steady state and a(t)=r(t)=ρ.
12The social planner’s problem is formulated as:





subject to ˙ K(t)=F(K(t),X(t)) − c, 0 ≤ X(t) ≤ φK(t),K (0) = K0 > 0, (20)
˙ S(t)=A(S(t),X(t)),S (0) = S0 > 0. (21)
The associated Hamiltonian is given by:
H(c,X,K,S,λ,ξ,μ)=u(c,S)+λ[F(K,X) − c]+ξA(S,X)+μ(φK − X).
If (c∗(t),X∗(t),K∗(t),S∗(t)) is an optimal path, then there exist the costate variables λ∗(t) and ξ∗(t)
and the Lagrange multiplier μ∗(t), with which (20), (21) and the following equations hold for each
t ≥ 0:
uc(c∗(t),S∗(t)) − λ∗(t)=0 (22)
λ∗(t)FX(K∗(t),X∗(t)) − ξ∗(t)AX(S∗(t),X∗(t)) − μ∗(t)=0 , (23)
˙ λ∗(t)/λ∗(t)=ρ − FK(K∗(t),X∗(t)) + φμ∗(t)/λ∗(t), (24)
˙ ξ∗(t)/ξ∗(t)=ρ − AS(S∗(t),X∗(t)) − uS(c∗(t),S∗(t))/ξ∗(t) (25)
μ∗(t) ≥ 0, and μ∗(t)[φK∗(t) − X∗(t)] = 0, (26)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
e−ρt [λ∗(t)K∗(t) − ξ∗(t)S∗(t)] = 0. (27)
In a decentralized economy with a tradable permit system (B,a(t)), the representative ﬁrm solves





u(c(t), ˜ S(t))e−ρtdt (28)











A competitive equilibrium in this subsection is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2: Competitive equilibrium. The tuple:
(πe(t),Xe(t),ye(t),Ke(t),Be(t),c e(t),m e(t), ˜ πe(t), ˜ Se(t),Se(t);re(t),p e(t);K0,S 0,B,a(t)),
is a competitive equilibrium if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. (πe(t),Xe(t),ye(t),Ke(t),Be(t)) is a solution to the ﬁrm’s problem (9) given (re(t),p e(t);B,a(t)).
2. (ce(t),m e(t)) is a solution to the household’s problem (28) given (K0, ˜ πe(t), ˜ Se(t),re(t)).
3. Se(t) is the solution to the initial problem, ˙ S(t)=A(S(t),Xe(t)) with S(0) = S0
4. ye(t)=0 , me(t)=Ke(t), ce(t)=F(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − ˙ Ke(t), Se(t)=˜ Se(t), πe(t)=˜ πe(t).
The counterpart of Proposition 1 is written as:




















where VS = ∂V (K,S)/∂S, the partial derivative of the value function deﬁned by (19). If X∗(t) <
φK∗(t), then (29) can be replaced with (15) in Proposition 1.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore, we address the
diﬀerent points. Suppose that an equilibrium path is optimal, that is, (ce(t),Xe(t),Ke(t),Se(t)) =



























From (25), we have (29). Notice that ξ∗(t)=VS(K∗(t),S∗(t)) by Léonard (1987).
Diﬀerent from the case of ﬂo wp o l l u t i o n ,t h ea p p r o p r i a t ep e r m i ti n t e r e s tr a t e sa r ed e t e r m i n e d
not only by the preferences, but also by the shadow price of the pollution stock VS. This complexity
remains even if the assimilation function has a simple form such as A(S,X)=X.T h e r e f o r e ,f o rt h e
case of stock pollution, we have simple rules only if the optimal path is interior (X∗ < φK∗). Then,
the rules 3(c) and 3(d) below Proposition 1 are also applicable to the pollution stock case.
2.3 Global warming model
As an important variation of the stock pollution model, this subsection considers a global warming
model. The carbon market is an artiﬁcial market established under the Kyoto Protocol of the
UNFCCC adopted in 1997. It is the largest market in the world for the control of emissions: The
size of the global carbon market was over $60 billion in 2007 and is expected to grow up to $3.12
trillion by 2020, according to the Point Carbon News (3/11 and 5/22, 2008). A remarkable feature
of global warming is the time lag over a few decades between the cause (greenhouse gas emissions)
and the consequence (the global climate change), mainly because of the long life of greenhouse gases
and the slow response of the oceans to atmospheric warming. There will be “unavoidable climate
change” over the next half century, regardless of actions to curb emissions from now (see IPCC 2007,
chapter 10). The time lag is far beyond a practical planning period. Reﬂecting this, we assume that
the planning horizon of a tradable permit system is ﬁnite T<∞ and the damages suﬀered within
the period are predetermined, whereas the pollution emissions in the period only aﬀect the future





subject to ˙ K(t)=F(K(t),X(t)) − c, 0 ≤ X(t) ≤ φK(t),K (0) = K0 > 0,
˙ S(t)=A(S(t),X(t)),S (0) = S0 > 0.
where the value function U values the discounted sum of utilities after period T. We assume that
U(·,·,T) is concave and diﬀerentiable. The optimal path is characterized by:
uc(c∗(t),t) − λ∗(t)=0 (31)
λ∗(t)FX(K∗(t),X∗(t)) − ξ∗(t)AX(S∗(t),X∗(t)) − μ∗(t)=0 , (32)
˙ λ∗(t)/λ∗(t)=ρ − FK(K∗(t),X∗(t)) + φμ∗(t)/λ∗(t), (33)
˙ ξ∗(t)/ξ∗(t)=ρ − AS(S∗(t),X∗(t)) (34)
μ∗(t) ≥ 0, μ∗(t)[φK∗(t) − X∗(t)] = 0, and (35)
λ∗(T)=UK(K∗(T),S∗(T),T), ξ∗(T)=US(K∗(T),S∗(T),T). (36)














subject to π(t)=F(K(t),X(t)) − r(t)K(t) − p(t)y(t)
˙ B(t)=a(t)B(t) − X(t)+y(t),B (0) = B,
K(t) ≥ 0,X(t) ∈ [0,φK(t)], and B(T) ≥ 0.





u(c(t),t)e−ρtdt + U(m(T), ˜ S(T),T)e−ρT (38)
subject to ˙ m(t)=r(t)m(t)+˜ π(t) − c, m(0) = K0 > 0 given.
16At equilibrium, (11) and the following hold:
Be(T) ≥ 0,p e(T)Be(T)=0 (39)
(a) uc(ce(t),t) − λ(t)=0 ,( b )˙ λ(t)/λ(t)=ρ − re(t), (c) λ(T)=UK(Ke(T), ˜ Se(T),T). (40)
Therefore, we have:
















The proof is almost the same as the proof of Proposition 2 and is thus omitted.
Now the permit interest rate a(t) depends only on the assimilation function A(S,X).As i m p l e
rule on a(t) is obtained if we can approximate A(S,X) by a linear function:
A(S,X)=θ(S − ¯ S)+X,
where the positive constant θ is the assimilation factor and ¯ S is a threshold at which the assimilation
mechanism changes from a negative feedback to a positive feedback when S exceeds ¯ S. The rule is to
set a(t)=θ. In particular, if θ =0 ,t h e nw eh a v ea(t)=0 , which is used in practice. Furthermore,
notice that if θ =0 ,t h e nS(T)=
R T
0 X(t)dt. That is the case where the total emissions aggregated
over the planning period matter. However, for the case of global warming, θ 6=0and it is not the
total emissions over time, but the concentration of greenhouse gases that aﬀects the global climate
system.6 Therefore, the appropriate permit interest rates to a carbon emission allowance cannot be
zero.
6Nordhaus (1999) presented informative simulation results comparing the costs incurred by various policy targets
such as the emissions, the concentrations, and the global temperatures.
173 Tradable permit system with a permit bank
The virtue of a tradable permit system is to fully make use of a market as a device for eﬃcient
resource allocation and to save government intervention for achieving eﬃciency. From this point
of view, it would be desirable if we could design a tradable permit system without setting permit
interest rates a(t). We can show that this is possible if we establish a permit bank as follows. In the
bank, each permit holder has an account of permits. Deposits and withdrawals are made in terms of
permits, whereas the balance is expressed in monetary terms by multiplying the quantity of permits
and the market price. The prevailing market interest rates are applied.
A tradable permit system with a permit bank is represented by the initial distribution of the
permits B, because now the permit interest rate a(t) does not need to be set exogenously. Denote by
Q(t) the monetary value of the permits held by the representative ﬁrm at time t, i.e., Q(t)=pe(t)B(t).
The state equation and the no-Ponzi game condition in the ﬁrm’s problem (9) are replaced with their
monetary units counterpart:












The associated Hamiltonian is written as:
HF(K,X,y,B,ζ,ν,t)=F(K,X)−r(t)K −p(t)y +η[r(t)Q(t) − p(t)X(t)+p(t)y(t)]+ν (φK − X).
Therefore, the following hold at equilibrium:
(a) FK(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − re(t)+ν(t)φ =0 ; (b) FX(Ke(t),Xe(t)) − pe(t) − ν(t)=0 ; (44)











For the household, there exists the costate variable λ(t) and the following hold at equilibrium as
18before:











where uc = uc(ce(t),Xe(t)) for the ﬂow pollution model and uc = uc(ce(t), ˜ Se(t)) for the stock
pollution model. Then, we have:
Proposition 4 With a permit bank, a tradable permit system B can achieve an optimal path for


























−uX/uc for the ﬂow pollution model
ξ∗(t)AX for the stock pollution model
,
where all functions are evaluated at the optimum and ξ∗(t) is deﬁned by the system (22)—(27).
Proof. Let r∗ and p∗ be the equilibrium prices. Suppose that the household expects the path
of pollution as ˜ X(t)=X∗(t) for the ﬂow pollution model and ˜ S(t)=S∗(t) for the stock pollution
model. For the ﬂow pollution model, there are the costates λ∗(t) and μ∗(t) and the optimal controls
c∗(t) and X∗(t) satisﬁes (5)—(8). Then, it is easy to see that the optimal path satisﬁes the suﬃcient
conditions for the individual optimality of the ﬁrm (44) and the household (45). Notice that the



















The same argument is applied to the stock pollution model.
19Proposition 4 is a desirable result. Once a permit bank is established, then the government
need not be bothered with ﬁnding appropriate permit interest rates. Instead of the government, a
market ﬁnds them. The idea of a permit bank comes from the analogy between permits and money
mentioned in the introduction. With a permit bank, tradable permits are similar to money. The
above equilibrium model somewhat resembles macro models with money such as cash-in-advance
and money-in-utility models. (see, for example, Woodford, 1994 and Benhabib et al., 2001).
4 Equilibrium dynamics
4.1 Model
The previous two sections examined how a tradable permit system can achieve eﬃciency. This
section examines whether it can be done with certainty. We analyze the equilibrium dynamics when
a tradable permit system is introduced in a competitive economy. Because the analysis in the general








, where σ > 0,β > 0, and γ > 0. (46)
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas:
F(K,X)=KαX1−α and X ≤ φK, where 0 < α < 1 and φ ≥ (ρ/α)1/(1−α). (47)












subject to ˙ K(t)=KαX1−α − c, X ≤ φK, and K(0) = K0 given.
The detailed analysis of this model can be found in Stokey (1998). Throughout this section, we
consider only an interior equilibrium path and ignore the pollution constraint X ≤ φK.
7As seen below, for the case of a tradable permit system with a permit bank, the dynamics are not completely
described by a system of diﬀerential equations.
204.2 Case of a tradable permit system with a permit bank
We ﬁrst examine a tradable permit system with a permit bank. By (43), (44) and (45), the equilib-
rium dynamics are given by:











(c) ˙ c(t)/c(t)=σ−1 [FK(K(t),X(t)) − ρ];











These equilibrium dynamics are unusual because they lack a diﬀerential equation for the evolution












which is obtained from (49 d) and (49 e).
To investigate the equilibrium dynamics, let r = FK(K,X). Then, F(K,X)=α−1rK and
FX(K,X)=[ ( 1− α)/α]r(K/X). Using these, the dynamics are:


























Given a path of interest rates r(t), the system (51) determines c(t) and K(t). The equilibrium path








21To keep (53) compatible with (52), we need to adjust r(0), which does not aﬀect the equilibrium
paths. This suggests that with a tradable permit system with a bank, a competitive equilibrium may
be indeterminate. The formal statement and its proof are as follows.
Let g(t)=˙ c(t)/c(t). We impose the following growth condition on g which is necessary for a




ρ − (1 − σ)g(s)ds = ∞.
Then, we have:
Proposition 5 For any measurable function g(t) satisfying the condition G, there is an equilibrium
path satisfying (49 a)—(49 e) that is characterized by:












































K(t) for all t>0, (56)
X(0) = X0 :=
⎡















r(t)=ρ + σg(t). (58)
Proof. We show that (54)—(57) are a solution of the system of (49 a)—(49 e). Take arbitrarily
g(t) and let c(t)=c0 exp
R t
0 g(s)ds as in the proposition. Because FK = r by (49 c) and (58), the
initial value problem (49 a) is solved as (55). K(t) must satisfy the transversality condition (49 b).




























































Note that limt→∞ r(t)=0is ruled out by the condition G. (56) follows from r = FK(K,X)=
α(X/K)1−α. The rest of the proof shows that (57) is equivalent to (50). Denote by ˜ C the lifetime
























Because FXX =( 1−α)F =( 1−α)( ˙ K +c), FK = r,a n drK = αF by (47), (49 a), and (49 c), this
equation is modiﬁed as:

































































Q + ˜ C
¾
,
w h e r et h et h i r dl i n eu s e si n t e g r a t i o nb yp a r t sa n dt h ef o u r t hl i n eu s e s( 4 9b ) . T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v e
Q = ˜ C − K0. Because FX(K,X)=( 1− α)(K/X)
α, (50) is equivalent to (58). Note that (50) is
equivalent to (49 d and e).
In Proposition 5, only the growth condition G is imposed on the consumption growth rate g.
Therefore, there are uncountable equilibrium paths. This indeterminacy is sometimes called global
indeterminacy, distinguished from local indeterminacy; the indeterminacy of the convergent paths to
a unique steady state. Under a global indeterminacy, we cannot ensure eﬃciency of an equilibrium
23path even in the long run.
4.3 Tradable permit system with permit interest rates
For the case of a tradable permit system with permit discount rates, regulatory authority sets a path
of permit interest rates a(t). By (43), (44) and (45), the equilibrium dynamics are given by:











(c) ˙ c(t)/c(t)=σ−1 [FK(K(t),X(t)) − ρ];
(d) (d/dt)(lnFX(K(t),X(t)) = FK(K(t),X(t)) − a(t);












where a(t) and B0 are given by (13) and (14) in Proposition 1, respectively. In contrast to the
equilibrium dynamics (49) for a tradable permit system with a permit bank, this system contains a
diﬀerential equation for X(t) in (59 d).
We examine the uniqueness for a special case where the initial capital stock equals an optimal
























Notice that FK(Kss,X ss)=ρ holds. Therefore, the regulatory authority designs the tradable permit
system (B0,a(t)) to satisfy:
a(t)=ρ and B0 = Xss/ρ. (61)
Let z(t)=K(t)/X(t) and zss = Kss/Xss =( ρ/α)
−1/(1−α). Then, (59 c) and (59 d) with (61) imply
that the consumption path is written as c(t)=ωz(t)α/σ with ω > 0. Now the equilibrium dynamics
24are:
















The system of diﬀerential equations (62 a) and (62 c) has a unique steady state (K∞,z ∞) which







It is easily veriﬁed that the steady state is a saddle point. Figure 1 depicts the phase diagram. If
the initial value is not on the stable manifold, either the capital stock is exhausted in a ﬁnite time
period or grows unboundedly. For the former case, there is no production after the capital stock is
used up, which cannot be chosen as an equilibrium path. For the latter case, from (62 a) the growth
rate of capital ˙ K/K is approximately equal to z
−(1−α)















→∞as t →∞ .
Therefore, the transversality condition (62 d) is violated. As a result, an equilibrium path must be
on the stable manifold and converges to the steady state (K∞,z ∞).
Using these results, we can show that the equilibrium path satisfying (62 a)—(62 d) is unique.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the initial stock of capital is Kss and the regulatory authority adopts
a tradable permit system (B0,a(t)) given by (61). Then a competitive equilibrium is unique and
coincides with the socially optimal path.
Proof. Recall that the steady state (K∞,z ss) of the system of diﬀerential equations (62 a) and
(62 c) depends on ω.I fω = Kss/z
(1−α+α/σ)
ss ,t h e nK∞ = Kss = K0 and the equilibrium path keeps
the initial stock level, which is socially optimal. If ω >K ss/z
(1−α+α/σ)
ss ,t h e nK∞ >K ss.T h i sc a s ei s
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Figure 1: Figure 1 Phase diagram of the equilibrium paths
illustrated in Figure 1 where point A is Kss. Because the equilibrium path goes up along the stable






(Kss/zss)e−ρtdt = Bss. (64)
Therefore, this case is ruled out. Consider the case of ω <K ss/z
(1−α+α/σ)
ss . This time, point B on
Figure 1 is Kss. The symmetric argument concludes that this case is ruled out, too. Therefore, we
have a unique ω = Kss/z
(1−α+α/σ)
ss and a unique equilibrium path satisfying (62) that coincides with
the optimal path of the social planner’s problem.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
T h ec r e a t i o no fa na r t i ﬁcial market by means of a tradable permit system is a prospective prescription
against market failure. However, in an intertemporal economy, we need an additional device to ensure
that the eﬃcient prices of permits satisfy the intertemporal arbitrage condition. We dealt with this
problem in two ways: to extrapolate the appropriate permit interest rates and to create a permit
bank.
For the former, we sought a set of conditions under which the appropriate permit interest rates
26are given by a simple rule. We obtained the following results:
1. If pollution ﬂows aﬀect utility and the marginal disutility is constant, then the permit interest
r a t e se q u a lt h et i m ed i s c o u n tr a t e( a(t)=ρ).
2. If pollution ﬂows aﬀect utility and the elasticity of the marginal disutility is constant γ > 0,
then a(t)=ρ − γ ˙ X∗(t)/X∗(t),w h e r eX∗(t) is the optimal path of the pollution ﬂows. In
particular, if ˙ X∗(t) < 0,t h e na(t) > ρ.
3. If the optimal path of pollution ﬂows is interior over time and the marginal abatement cost of
pollution is constant, then the permit interest rates equal the interest rates (a(t)=r(t)). This
rule is applicable to both cases where pollution ﬂows and pollution stocks aﬀect utility.
4. If the optimal path of pollution ﬂows is interior over time and the elasticity of the marginal
abatement cost is constant β > 0,t h e na(t)=r(t)−β ˙ X∗(t)/X∗(t). In particular, if ˙ X∗(t) < 0,
then a(t) >r (t). This rule is applicable to both cases where pollution ﬂows and pollution
stocks aﬀect utility.
5. For the global warming case, if the natural assimilation function can be approximated by a
linear function, then a(t)=θ. Here, a positive constant θ is the assimilation factor to the
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.
We showed that a tradable permit system with a permit bank can achieve eﬃciency without
governmental intervention such as setting the permit interest rates. However, indeterminacy of
equilibria may arise. While the indeterminacy can be a serious problem because one cannot ensure
an eﬃcient equilibrium, it is not indigenous to this policy measure. The indeterminacy can emerge
in a laissez faire economy as well as an economy regulated with an environmental tax. (see Itaya,
2008.) How to tame the indeterminacy is a future research agenda.
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